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Abstract 
 
We use new firm-level data to examine the effects of spinoffs and privatization on 
corporate performance in a rapidly emerging market economy. Unlike the existing literature, 
which analyzes spinoffs almost exclusively in advanced economies, we control for 
accompanying ownership changes and the fact that spinoffs and ownership are endogenous 
variables. We find that spinoffs increase the firm’s profitability but do not alter its scale of 
operations, while the effect of privatization depends on the resulting ownership structure – 
sometime improving performance and sometime bringing about decline that is consistent with 
tunneling (looting) by managers or (partial) owners. The effects of privatization are hence much 
less clear-cut than suggested in earlier studies. Methodologically, our study provides evidence 
that it is important to control for changes in ownership when analyzing spinoffs and generally to 
control for endogeneity, selection and data attrition when analyzing the effects of spinoffs and 
privatization. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate spinoffs play an important part in advanced market economies and they have 
been widely researched in the literature. Hausman, Tardiff, and Belinfante (1993) for instance 
show in the US context that the breakup of a nationwide telephone company into several units 
brought about opportunity for gains in economic efficiency. There is also evidence that parent 
companies experience positive cumulative abnormal excess returns at the announcement of the 
spinoff (e.g., Hite and Owers, 1983, Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983, Schipper and Smith, 1983), and 
that both the spun-off units and parent firms have positive abnormal returns after spinoff and 
experience significantly more takeovers than similar firms with no spinoffs (Cusatis, Miles, and 
Woolridge, 1993).
1 Woo, Willard, and Daelenbach (1992) and Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar 
(1997) show that spin-offs record improvements in operating performance, while Ahn and Denis 
(2004) argue that post-spinoff there is an improvement in investment efficiency and Dittmar and 
Shivdasani (2003) find that after the spinoff parent companies improve internal allocation of 
capital and increase their rate of investment. Similarly, Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002) 
report that spinoffs increase the efficiency of capital allocation, while Hite and Owers (1983), 
Rosenfeld (1984) and Desai and Jain (1999) note that spinoffs improve managerial efficiency by 
reducing the potential for misallocation of capital, eliminating cross-subsidies, and enabling 
improved investment decisions. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) analyze spinoffs from 
the point of view of information asymmetry
2 and suggest that many spinoffs are motivated by the 
desire to mitigate the information asymmetry problem. Maxwell and Rao (2003), on the other 
hand, show that spinoffs are viewed negatively in the bond markets and that part of the overall 
gain associated with spinoffs is in fact a wealth transfer from bondholders to stock holders. 
Overall, the literature suggests that in the advanced economies spinoffs increase value but also 
have important distributional effects.
3 
From the methodological standpoint, the literature has important limitations in that the 
studies implicitly treat spinoffs as exogenous rather than using for example instrumental variable 
                                                 
1 McConnell, Ozbilgin, and Wahal (2001) investigate whether a strategy of buying spun-off firms once they begin 
trading as independent stocks provide a way to earn excess returns and they conclude negatively. 
2 Information asymmetry in the market is understood in the context of profitability and efficiency of different 
divisions of the firm. It was found that firms engaged in spin-offs have higher levels of information asymmetry 
about their value than their industry- and size-matched counterparts. 
3 There is also an important literature on the opposite phenomenon of spinoffs and breakups, namely mergers. As 
Focarelli and Panetta (2003) indicate, while the short-term welfare effects of mergers appear to be negative, the 
long-term effects may be positive.   2
estimation to control for their endogeneity, and in many studies the data do not permit 
researchers to compare the performance of the spun-off units before and after the spinoffs. 
Moreover, while Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) provide evidence that changes in 
ownership structure after the spinoffs affect positively the firm’s rate of return, the rest of the 
literature does not control for ownership changes that occur with spinoffs. These endogeneity 
and omitted variable problems may have produced biased estimates of the effects of spinoffs. We 
address these issues in the present study. 
Spinoffs are also important in the transition and emerging market economies. They are 
frequently observed together with privatization and the two phenomena represent a key form of 
corporate restructuring as enterprises break up into two or more units. In this context, it may be 
hypothesized that spinoffs and privatization improve corporate performance as the new firms 
strive to gain reputation and introduce superior governance. Given the underdeveloped legal 
framework in many emerging markets, however, spinoffs and privatization may also be 
mechanisms for self-enrichment of managers through tunneling (looting). By the same token, as 
the institutional and legal setting improves, spinoffs and some forms of ownership may improve 
performance by serving as disciplining devices for management. The theoretical model 
developed by Chemmanur and Yan (2004) is relevant in this setting because it shows how 
spinoffs may increase the probability of a takeover by value-improving management that 
enhances operating performance after the spinoff. Similarly, Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge’s 
(1993) evidence from an advanced country context that ownership structure after the spinoffs 
affects positively the firm’s rate of return suggests that the challenge is to estimate the respective 
effects of spinoffs and ownership changes when assessing post-spinoff performance.  
Although spinoffs and breakups are important phenomena in the transition and emerging 
market economies, a lack of adequate data has prevented researchers from analyzing them. The 
exception is Lizal, Singer and Svejnar (2001) who use Czech data from the start of the transition 
and show that small and medium sized spinoffs have positive effects on productive efficiency 
and profitability of both the parent companies and spun-off units in the year when the spinoff 
occurs. They also find the effect to be less significant in the subsequent year – presumably 
because of increased competition and/or tunneling by managers. The Lizal, Singer and Svejnar 
(2001) paper offers only limited evidence, however, as the authors do not know the identity of 
firms and have to use indirect methods to identify spinoffs and link the spun-off units to the   3
parent firms. Moreover, the data allows the authors to follow the firms only during the year of 
the spinoff (1991) and in the following year (1992). This hence prevents them from evaluating 
the medium-term effects of spinoffs and from estimating the effects of privatization. Finally, 
similarly to the literature on advanced market economies, Lizal, Singer and Svejnar (2001) do 
not have the necessary data to analyze the difference in performance before and after the 
breakups. 
The literature on the effects of privatization in the transition and emerging market 
economies is substantial (see e.g., Megginson and Netter, 2001, and Djankov and Murrell, 2002, 
for surveys). However, most studies do not control adequately for the fact that firms are unlikely 
to be assigned for privatization at random and the estimated effects may hence be biased (see 
Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 1999). In particular, Djankov and Murrell (2002) point out that 47% of 
the studies surveyed in their paper do not control for endogeneity or selection problems at all, 
while Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (1999) show that even studies that use a fixed effects or 
difference in differences approach may yield biased estimates in the absence of using appropriate 
instrumental variables (IVs). Finally, DeWenter and Malatesta (2001) show that profitability 
improves immediately before privatization, but the evidence on subsequent improvement under 
private ownership is mixed. Overall, the early literature has been quite sanguine about the 
positive effects of privatization on performance, while recent studies suggest that an analytically 
rigorous reassessment may be in order. 
In this paper, we use a new firm-level data set from a model transition economy (Czech 
Republic) to estimate the respective effects of spinoffs and privatization on corporate 
performance. The dataset is unique in that we know the identity of firms and observe values of 
indicators of corporate performance for the spun-off units (representing all parts of the parent 
company) both before and after the breakup of the parent firm. We also have the corresponding 
data for firms that did not experience spinoffs. This permits us to carry out an analysis that could 
not be performed for spinoffs in either the advanced or emerging market context before. 
Moreover, since we have data for variables from the pre-transition period when central planners 
exogenously set the values of many firm-level variables, we can construct credible instrumental 
variables to control for the possible endogeneity of both spinoffs and changes in ownership. 
Methodologically, we also advance the literature by being able to employ for a part of our 
analysis the difference-in-differences (DID) estimation that represents an appealing approach for   4
evaluating outcomes before and after a specific treatment. The DID approach has not be used in 
the literature on spinoffs because pre-spinoff performance data on spun-off units have not been 
available. 
The Czech Republic constitutes a particularly good laboratory for analyzing the effects of 
spinoffs and privatization on financial and economic performance in emerging markets. During 
the late 1980s and early-to-mid 1990s the country had many features found in other emerging 
market economies, but the variation in the values of the relevant variables was much greater. 
Hence, while emerging market economies are usually characterized by a transition from 
significant to less pronounced state ownership, with spinoffs being one of the mechanisms of 
corporate restructuring, in the Czech Republic these processes were much more pronounced. The 
country started in 1990 as an almost completely state-owned, controlled and trade-protected 
economy, with its corporate sector being dominated by large SOE conglomerates. It rapidly 
opened itself to trade, liberalized prices and by 1995 it was transformed into an overwhelmingly 
privately-owned market economy. In the process, most of the large SOE conglomerates were 
broken up and the number of the medium and large industrial firms more than tripled on account 
of numerous spinoffs, as well as entry of newly created firms. 
The structural and institutional features observed in the emerging market economies in 
general, and the Czech Republic in particular, lead us to test two competing hypotheses with 
respect to spinoffs and privatization: 
1.  Spinoffs and privatization have a positive effect on the performance of the resulting units 
by eliminating prior inefficiencies such as diseconomies of scale of large SOE 
conglomerates, weak managerial incentives, information asymmetries, and a lack of 
focus on core competence.
4 
2.  The effects of spinoffs and privatization on performance are negative on account of 
tunneling (looting) by managers and/or (partial) owners in the presence of waning 
government control, unclear property rights and corporate governance, and weak market-
oriented legal framework. 
With respect to privatization, we also explore whether the nature of the effect depends on the 
type of new ownership structure. In particular, we are able distinguish the extent to which each 
                                                 
4 See Prahalad and Hamel (1990).   5
firm is owned by an industrial firm, financial company, individual owner, or state, and we can 
estimate the effect of different ownership patterns on corporate performance.
5 
We find that spinoffs and privatization have a number of significant but also some 
insignificant effects on corporate performance. The average spinoff increases the firm’s 
profitability and scale of operations (sales), while the effect of privatization very much depends 
on the resulting ownership structure. The overall evidence for spinoffs is consistent with our first 
hypothesis, namely that spinoffs have a positive effect on performance. Reducing state 
ownership is positive for some performance indicators but insignificant or even negative for 
others. Industrial firms as owners improve or do not hamper performance and in that sense they 
behave consistently with our first hypothesis. Financial companies and individuals as owners are 
mostly associated with no improvement and in some cases significant declines in performance, 
thus providing evidence that is consistent with tunneling (looting) by managers and/or owners. 
The effects of privatization are hence much less positive and clear-cut than was suggested in 
many of the early studies. Methodologically, our study shows that it is important to control for 
changes in ownership when analyzing the effect of spinoffs and to control for endogeneity, 
selection and data attrition when analyzing the effects of spinoffs and privatization. 
  The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the institutional setting 
underlying our analysis, while in Section 3 we discuss our data, variables and the method for 
identifying spinoffs. Section 4 describes our estimating framework and Section 5 presents our 
empirical results. We conclude in Section 6.  
 
2. The Institutional Setting 
In this section we briefly outline the main features of the institutional setting underlying 
the spinoffs and privatization in the Czech Republic. The spinoffs took place mostly during the 
privatization program that was carried out in the first half of the 1990s under three different 
schemes: restitution, small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization. The first two 
schemes started in 1990 and were most important during the early years of the transition. Large-
scale privatization, by far the most important scheme, began in 1991 and was completed in early 
                                                 
5 Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2004) provide a literature review on the topic of ownership structure and 
performance and suggest hypotheses about the effects of particular types of owner on firm performance.   6
1995.
6 The large privatization program allowed for various privatization techniques. Small firms 
were usually auctioned or sold in tenders. Many medium businesses were sold in tenders or to 
predetermined buyers in direct sales. Most large and many medium firms were transformed into 
joint stock companies and their shares were distributed through voucher privatization (almost 
one-half of the total number of all shares of all joint stock companies was privatized in the 
voucher scheme), sold in public auctions or to strategic partners, or transferred to municipalities. 
The voucher scheme was part of the large-scale privatization process and two waves of voucher 
privatization took place in 1992-93 and 1993-94, respectively.
7 The early post-privatization 
ownership structure emerged as shares from the first and second wave were distributed in 1993 
and early 1995 respectively. There was also a significant post-privatization wave of share trading 
(often swapping of large blocks of shares off the official stock market) among large shareholders 
during this period. 
Privatization of each enterprise was based on an officially accepted privatization project. 
The management of each enterprise was obliged by law to submit a privatization proposal, but 
any domestic or foreign firm, institution or individual could present a competing privatization 
project. In reality, there was more than one privatization proposal submitted for numerous 
enterprises. All proposals were to be considered on an equal footing by the privatization 
authorities, which worked with the investors to ensure that the final submitted proposals reflected 
at least in part government objectives in terms of ownership structure and other characteristics. 
Each project proposal had to contain recent economic and financial information about the 
enterprise and describe the proposed method of privatization, as well as the proposed 
organization of the privatized enterprise.
8 
The decisions regarding spinoffs were taken by the relevant government ministries in 
conjunction with the government privatization authority. The decision for each firm was based 
on the winning privatization project that outlined the proposed framework for the spinoff(s). 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize information about the privatization projects.
9 The tables show that the 
                                                 
6 The privatization process has been extensively described and analyzed. See e.g., Svejnar and Singer (1994), Kotrba 
(1995), Coffee (1996), Kočenda (1999), and Filer and Hanousek (2000). 
7 For firm analysis on issues of ownership, control, and performance after large-scale privatization see Hanousek, 
Kocenda, and Svejnar (2004). 
8 For more details see Kotrba and Svejnar (1994) who offer a description of the privatization projects. 
9 Privatization of each state owned firm was decided on the basis of an officially accepted privatization project. 
According to the law, all state owned enterprises were selected either for the first or the second privatization wave, 
or they were temporarily exempted. Each selected firm had to submit an official privatization proposal that was   7
interest to privatize originated from management as well as other parties since on average almost 
5 projects were submitted per firm. The projects were approved at an average rate of 2 per firm, 
reflecting the spinoffs as well as government objectives. Since management was obliged to 
submit a privatization proposal, it comes as no surprise that 25% of projects came from this 
source. Independent bidders that wanted to privatize by purchasing (a part of) a firm submitted 
two fifth (39%) of all projects. There are no other sizable categories of project proposers. 
 
3. Data, Identification of Spinoffs, and Definitions of Variables 
The data were compiled by the authors from Aspekt, a commercial database, and from 
the archives of the Ministry of Privatization and the National Property Fund of the Czech 
Republic. The data allow us to identify unambiguously the parent enterprises and all the post-
spinoff units related to the 1991-1992 surge of spinoffs.
10 Unlike Lizal, Singer, and Svejnar 
(2001), we can hence directly observe the spinoffs and we also have a larger sample. Our data set 
contains 131 spun-off units, corresponding to 44 parent companies, and 780 firms that did not 
experienced any spinoff (the control group). The spinoffs result from breakups of the parent 
firms and all the spun-off units receive new tax identification numbers and have the same rights 
to use the brand and/or trade name of the former master enterprise. Based on the identified 
ownership structure available from our data, we assign firm ownership to the following 
categories of owners: the state, industrial firm, individual owner, or financial company.
11 
The dataset is also unique in that we have pre spinoff data for both parent enterprises and 
the spun-off units. This means that we have performance data and firm characteristics of spun-
off units after the spinoff, but also during the time when they were parts of the original parent 
enterprise. We use this information in constructing variables measuring the size of the spinoff 
and in our difference in differences analysis. 
The firms in our data set were slated by the government for privatization in the first wave 
of the voucher scheme. For each firm we have detailed information derived from all the proposed 
privatization projects that were submitted to the government before privatization. This includes 
                                                                                                                                                             
usually crafted by the firm’s management under the tutelage (and responsibility) of its sectoral ministry. Any 
domestic or foreign corporate body or individual was allowed to present a competing project that was to be 
considered on an equal footing to the official one. 
10 Most spinoffs took place in 1991. 
11 The category financial company includes ownership by banks, privatization investment funds, and financial 
intermediaries/brokerages.   8
the relevant information about the spinoff, the links between the parent company and spun-off 
units, the privatization scheme, and information on assets, liabilities, profit, sales and number of 
employees in 1990. The number of privatization projects submitted for any given firm is per se 
an important factor for our analysis since for many SOEs there were several privatization 
projects submitted and each privatization project reflected the structure of the firm, manager’s 
motives, degree of investor interest, and expected future performance of the firm. For many 
firms, however, a number of proposals were submitted for privatizing a particular small asset that 
was not connected with the firm’s production activity (e.g., the firm’s recreational facility). In 
order to avoid mixing these privatization projects with those covering principal productive 
activities, we only consider projects aiming at privatizing 5% or more of the enterprise’s assets. 
Table 3 displays the available pre-spinoff 1990 economic indicators for the spun-off units, parent 
firms and firms in the control group. 
We also have data on the structure of share ownership among various domestic and 
foreign parties as proposed in the winning privatization projects. The share ownership variables 
include the share that the government intended to keep for the short vs. long term. Short-term 
government ownership reflects the expectation that the government would be able to sell 
appreciated shares shortly after privatization, while long-term government ownership indicates 
an expectation of slower appreciation of the value of the privatized firm and/or its strategic 
character in the economy. Parts of the shares retained by the government were also classified as 
intended for restitution or future sale through an intermediary (see Table 4 for data on the 
allocation of shares for other purposes than voucher privatization).
12 
Characteristics of geographic and industry location of the firms are summarized in Table 
5. The frequency of firms in the various regions indicates that firms were distributed relatively 
evenly across the country. The only exception was the less developed region of Southern 
Bohemia where one observes few firms. Table 5 also indicates that industry is heavily 
concentrated in the capital of Prague that is situated in the middle of Central Bohemia, whose 
relatively low proportion of firms reflects the fact that many firms are in Prague. Most of the 
firms belong to the sector of heavy machinery; this proportion conforms to the former structure 
of the Czech economy under the command system. Naturally, the firms in this sector were most 
                                                 
12 Mean proportion of shares allocated to various owners (other than through voucher scheme) sum-up to 15.7% for 
spun-off units and 15.5% for the control group of firms.   9
in need of restructuring and the breakups of large conglomerates were the start of this process. 
We exclude firms in the forestry sector since these represent rather atypical examples of 
privatization.
13 
  In analyzing corporate performance after the wave of spinoffs and privatization, we use 
economic and financial indicators for the period 1995-1996. The spinoffs that we analyze 
occurred in 1991-92, the accompanying privatization in 1992-93, and the distribution of shares 
of the privatized firms and the major post-privatization swaps of shares in 1993-94. Since for 
some of the firms the transfer of ownership rights ended in 1994 or very early 1995, we take 
1995 to be the first year after spinoffs and privatization that truly reflects the new corporate and 
ownership structure. Moreover, by 1995 the quality of the reported accounting and economic 
data starts approaching international standards. Finally, using data for both 1995 and 1996 allows 
us to test for time-varying effects of spinoffs and privatization. Hence, in our estimation, we use 
data on early enterprise performance from 1990, firms splits from 1991-2 and post-spinoff, post-
privatization performance from 1995-96. 
Our data permit us to use three indicators of corporate performance in our main model: 
unit labor cost measured by labor costs over sales (labor costs/sales), operating profit over labor 
costs (profit/labor costs), and operating profit per share (profit/equity). Our main analysis is 
hence based on a measure of (labor) cost effectiveness and two direct measures of profitability. 
Finally, in our DID analysis we are able to use sales as a measure of scale of operation. 
 
4. The Estimating Framework 
Before presenting our formal model, we outline its stylized form in Figure 1. As may be 
seen from the figure, the pre-spinoff initial conditions, the nature of the breakup of the parent 
firm and the change in ownership may all affect subsequent corporate performance. Moreover, 
the pre-spinoff, pre-privatization conditions are also likely to influence the nature of the spinoff 
and the form of privatization. Therefore, in analyzing the effects of spinoffs, we benefit from the 
fact that we are able to identify the parent company as well as the spun-off units, and we have 
                                                 
13 Under the command system, forests were in state hands and majority of forested land is still managed by state. 
Relatively minor forest estates were returned in the restitution process, while the rest was subject to fierce 
acquisition interests of small groups of hunters in rural areas that wanted to maintain their former past-time activities 
intact. Many of the privatization projects and decisions linked to forests were subject to delays and political 
pressures due to various restitution claims. Some have not been implemented to date.   10
acceptable instrumental variables with which to control for the fact that spinoffs may be 
systematically related to unobserved firm characteristics rather than being carried out at random. 
We consider the shares of pre-spinoff capital and labor that each spun-off unit 
appropriates from the parent firm at the time of the spinoff to be the key indicators of the extent 
of each spinoff. As a result, we use the 1990 ratio of capital in the spun-off firm to total capital in 
the former parent enterprise  i dK  and the 1990 ratio of the number of employees in the spun-off 
firm to the total number of employees in the former parent enterprise  i dL  as explanatory 
variables capturing the size of the spinoff in the performance equations. Both shares are to a 
large extent given by the organizational structure of the parent firm before the split. As may be 
seen from Figure 2, most spinoffs took over both labor and capital from the pre-spinoff firm, 
with the largest concentration of observations being in the segment where spun-off units are 
endowed with up to 40% of capital and labor of the former parent firm. It is also clear from 
Figure 2, however, that a significant number of spinoffs were quite labor- or capital-intensive. 
Finally, the economic situation in the parent enterprise before the split also contains other rich 
information that we take into account in our analysis. 
Formally, we estimate the following model of corporate performance: 
() ( ) i i i i i i i i dK dL ns OWN s OWN S X ε δ χ γ β α α π + + + + + + = 1 0    (1) 
where index i denotes firms,  i π  is a measure of corporate performance of firm i after the spinoffs 
and privatization occurred (1995-96),  i X  captures the pre-spinoff, pre-privatization (1990) 
economic situation in the parent firm measured by assets, liabilities, sales, profit, and number of 
employees, and  i S  is a dummy variable coded 1 if the enterprise is a spun-off unit and 0 if it is a 
firm that did not experience a breakup. Variables  ( )i s OWN  and  ( )i ns OWN  measure the post-
privatization (1995-96) ownership structure in companies that experienced spinoffs and those 
that did not, respectively, while β and γ are the associated coefficients. Finally, εi is the error 
term. 
 
Endogeneity of Spinoffs and Ownership 
As we discussed earlier, spinoffs and changes in ownership structure may be correlated 
with firms’ unobserved characteristics. As a result, we treat spinoffs and ownership as 
endogenous and apply instrumental variable (IV) estimation. The advantage of the IV procedure   11
over the more efficient maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is that it is more robust and does 
not require numerical integration in the presence of the dummy and share variables for spinoffs 
and ownership. In particular, we use the following logit model to estimate the probability of a 
spinoff occurring: 
i
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where  i S  is equal to 1 if company i is a spun-off unit and 0 otherwise,  i NP  refers to the number 
of privatization projects submitted to the government in 1991,  i DE  captures how much the size 
of each firm deviates in 1990 from the standard in the market economies (discussed below), 
i POWN  stands for the ownership structure proposed in 1991 in the winning privatization project 
(expressed in percentage intended for ownership type defined by categories listed in Table 4), 
i REG  represents a set of seven regional dummy variables,  i PP measures the profitability of the 
(parent) firm in 1990, and  i PTNS  represents the total number of shares in the parent firm in 
1990. The effects of variables such as the firm’s distance from the mean (median) OECD size, 
profitability, and total number of shares may be nonlinear and we hence use a Taylor series 
expansion of the second and third order to obtain a specification that can take into account 
potential nonlinearities (the order of expansion is denoted by j in equation (2)). 
  The variable  i DE  is measured as the number of employees in a firm in 1990 minus the 
number of employees in a (weighted) average firm in a given industrial sector in the OECD 
economies at the time (see Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 1999).
14 We take the mean OECD firm 
size as a benchmark because the transition countries declared their commitment to move towards 
a standard market economy and many, including the Czech Republic, succeeded in joining the 
OECD soon after the start of the transition. One of the determining factors for a spinoff is 
therefore likely to be the size of the firms that emerged from the centrally planned system, 
relative to the size of firms in established market (OECD) economies. Since the planners 
preferred large firms, the value of  i DE  is typically, but not always, positive. 
  We use the following regression to instrument the ownership structure observed in 1995 
and 1996: 
                                                 
14 We have used both the mean and median firm size and the results are similar. The mean and median numbers of 
employees by industrial sector in OECD countries are given in Table 2 of Kumar et al. (1999).   12
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where  i IND  are one-digit industry dummies,  i PTNS  is the total number of shares (the share of 
each company was set at the same nominal value before the large-scale privatization), and  i AP  is 
the average price per share of company i in the voucher privatization scheme.  i PIFh  and  i IIh  are 
the shares of company i allocated to privatization investment funds and individual investors, 
respectively, during the large-scale privatization in 1992. The effects of variables such as the 
firm’s total number of shares and shares allocated to the institutional and individual investors 
may be nonlinear, and we hence use a Taylor series expansion of the third order to obtain a 
specification that can take into account potential nonlinearities. 
 
Selection Bias Due to Attrition 
In estimating equation (1), we may experience a selection bias because about 24% of 
firms observed in 1990 do not report data for 1995-96. The bias may be present despite the fact 
that attrition occurred similarly in the groups of firms that experienced spinoffs and those that 
did not. We therefore use the Hausman (1978) procedure to correct for this bias by estimating a 
selection equation and inserting the resulting inverse Mills’ ratio into equation (1). 
The selection probit equation is specified as follows:
15 
i i i i
j
j
i i i IND V PIFh PTNS AP g M η + = ∑
=
) , , , ) ( , (
3
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      ( 4 )  
where  i M  equals zero if company i has missing performance data in 1995-1996,  i V  refers to the 
percentage of company shares sold in voucher scheme,  i IND  is a set of one-digit industrial 
sector dummy variables, and the other variables are as defined earlier. Estimated coefficients 
from this auxiliary probit regression are available upon request.
16 
 
 
                                                 
15 The logit specification in equation (2) resulted from standard Hausman correction procedure. In specification (3) 
we can use either probit or logit. We prefer logit, since it is less sensitive to the actual distribution of the error term. 
For the sake of consistency we employed both methods and found them to yield similar results. 
16 The goodness of fit, measured by an adjusted R
2, ranges from 0.09 to 0.1. Note that goodness of fit is not an issue 
here because specification (3) is a correction equation. In this case poor fit could be interpreted as resulting from the 
fact that missing observations in equation (1) are randomly distributed.   13
Difference-in-Differences (DID) 
For one key performance variable – sales -- we have comparable 1990 and 1995-96 data 
on the spun-off units within the parent firms and firms that did not experience spinoffs.
17 For 
sales (a measure of restructuring tied to the scale of operations), we can hence use the DID 
method of estimation as an alternative to equation (1), taking the spinoff and privatization as the 
treatment variables that may alter the performance of the firm.
18  
The DID estimation may also be motivated by the data pattern depicted in Figure 3. The 
data relate the i dK  and i dL  of each spun-off firm to the change in its sales between 1990 and 
1995-96, with a positive change being denoted by a triangle and a negative one by a minus sign. 
The solid and broken lines depict the trends in the location of the positive and negative changes 
in performance, respectively. Firms with improving performance exhibit higher initial 
capital/labor ratios than firms whose performance worsened over time. Differences in slopes of 
these two trend lines were statistically significant at 1% percent level. 
Taking into account other variables, our specification of the DID model is 
() ( ) i i i i i i i i MR dK dL ns OWN s OWN S ε φ δ χ γ β α π + + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆  (5) 
where  i π ∆  is a measure of the difference in sales between 1990 and 1995-96 and 
i OWN ∆ captures the change in ownership structure between 1990 and 1995-96, where 100% 
state ownership is the pre-spinoff and pre-privatization original ownership.
19 Since we use the 
DID approach,  i OWN ∆  represents diminished share of state control as compared to pre-
privatization stage, and coefficients β and γ capture interaction between split and subsequent 
                                                 
17 The problem that we face with respect to other variables is that the (communist) variable definitions in 1990 differ 
dramatically from the (international) definitions in 1995-96. For example, unsold inventories were included as part 
of a firm’s profit in 1990 but not in 1995-96, and artificial invoicing was common in 1990 as invoiced products were 
included in profit and improved the firm’s image. Thus, using profit in the DID estimation would most likely yield 
distorted results. In the period after privatization (from the end of 1994 on) accounting rules conforming to the 
international (IAP) standard were already in place. They are different from those used prior to 1991 when majority 
of spinoffs took place. 
18 In equation (1) we control for the 1990 values of key performance variables by including them as regressors Xi, 
but we do not constrain the dependent variable to be in the form of a difference between the 1995-96 and 1990 
values. 
19 We use the pre-spinoff, pre-privatization ownership structure in 1990 and the post-spinoff, post-privatization one 
in 1995 and 1996. Privatization of firms within the first wave of the voucher scheme was concluded in 1993 and 
1994, but it was not until 1995 that new owners could affect ownership structure or execute sovereign corporate 
governance in privatized and spun-off firms.   14
change in ownership structure. Finally,  i MR  is the Mills’ ratio from the Heckman correction 
(equation 3) and as in specification (1), we use  i dK  and  i dL  as explanatory variables. 
The validity of DID estimates may be affected by the potential endogeneity of the 
treatment variables, in our case spinoffs and privatization (see Besley and Case, 1994). To 
overcome this problem, we use the approach and variables as defined in equations (2) and (3), 
respectively. Since shares of labor and capital interact with the process of a spinoff, we also 
instrument the capital and labor ratios. The instrumental variables that we use are the industry-
specific average dK and dL for groups of firms that did not experience spinoffs. Due to the 
absence of spinoff, the size of these firms can be considered as appropriate one with respect to 
ratios of labor and capital in a particular sector. Moreover, the computed average is not 
correlated with the error term in equation (5) that considers only firms where spinoff occurred. 
Furthermore, we use the series of average dK and dL for groups of all firms across various 
industry sectors. This average ratio is computed for all firms within a sector with each firm 
experiencing spinoff consecutively omitted one at a time so that a large set of averages is 
available. Omitting a firm that experienced spinoff eliminates potential correlation with the error 
term and an average constructed this way is by definition a valid instrument. Finally, we also use 
one-digit industry dummy variables as instruments. 
The DID estimates may also be biased as a result of serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo 
and Mullainathan, 2004). Fortunately, in our case this is unlikely to be a serious problem because 
the time dimension of our panel data is very short and the cross-section dimension quite large. 
Nevertheless, to check the sensitivity of our results, we have also generated estimates based on 
data that were aggregated into one observation before the treatment and one observation after the 
treatment. The results are not materially different. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The estimated coefficients of equation (1) are reported in Table 7. We started by 
estimating the effect of the extent of a spinoff by interacting the share of labor dL as well as the 
share of capital dK in the spun-off unit with annual dummy variables for 1995 and 1996, 
respectively. This time-varying coefficient specification generated similar 1995 and 1996 point 
estimates of the corresponding coefficients (Table A1 in the Appendix). We have therefore 
performed F-tests to verify whether the separate effects for 1995 and 1996 could be constrained   15
into a single coefficient for each variable. In all cases, we have been able to accept the restricted 
model. In Table 7, we hence report estimates from this more parsimonious specification.  
In view of the discrepancy between the specification of Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge 
(1993), who control for ownership changes in analyzing spinoffs and the rest of the spinoff 
literature that does not, we have tested whether our data permit us to exclude the ownership 
variables from the estimating equations. The relevant F-tests indicate that specifications that 
exclude the ownership variables are mis-specified. The results hence suggest that analyses of 
spinoffs ought to take into account the accompanying changes in the ownership structure. 
Finally, the Hausman (1978) tests for endogeneity of spinoffs and ownership indicate that 
the IV method is superior to OLS in all regressions, and in Tables 7 and 8 we hence report the IV 
estimates.
20 These tests suggest that the literature on spinoffs needs to take into account the fact 
that spinoffs and ownership changes may be endogenously determined rather than brought about 
by a random assignment. 
The estimated coefficient on S in Table 7 indicates that the base effect of spinoffs is 
insignificant for labor cost/sales, but positive and statistically significant for profit/labor costs 
and profit/equity. Holding the relative factor intensity of the spinoffs constant, the base 
performance effect of spinoffs is hence positive for the two measures of profitability, but 
insignificant for the unit labor cost. 
The effect of spinoffs on profit/equity varies significantly with both dL and dK, the effect 
on labor cost/sales varies with dK only and the effect on profit/labor cost is invariant with respect 
to the labor and capital intensity of the spun-off unit. In particular, the effect of dL is positive and 
significant on profit/equity and insignificant on labor costs/sales and profit/labor cost. The effect 
of increasing the spinoff in terms of the labor share of the original parent firm is hence to 
increase or leave unaffected the spun-off unit’s profitability and leave unchanged its unit labor 
cost. 
The semi-elasticity of labor costs/sales with respect to dK is negative, suggesting that 
larger spinoffs in terms of the share of capital appropriated from the parent firm are more 
efficient in that they decrease the unit labor cost of the spun-off firm. As was the case with dL, 
the effect of dK on profit/labor cost is insignificant. However, its effect on profit/equity is 
                                                 
20 We do not have an excessive number of instruments and our regressions pass the test of over-identifying 
restrictions.   16
negative and significant. The effect of increasing a spinoff’s share of parent firm’s capital is 
hence to enlarge the spun off firms’ (labor) cost efficiency and decrease or leave unaffected its 
profitability. 
Given that the effects of spinoffs vary in terms of the base effect and the size of the 
spinoff in terms of dL and dK, it is informative to calculate the mean effect of spinoffs on each 
indicator of performance. When we take into account the effect of S and evaluate the 
performance effects of spinoffs at the mean values of dL and dK, using the estimated variance-
covariance matrix, we find that the mean effects and corresponding standard errors are -0.010 
(0.029) for the labor cost/sales, 1.011 (0.505) for profit/labor cost, and 0.170 (0.066) for 
profit/equity. The three effects point in the direction of spinoffs reducing costs and increasing 
profitability. However, only the average effects on the profitability indicators are statistically 
significant because the statistical significance of the base effect S dominates in the calculation of 
the statistical significance the average effect. The average spinoff therefore has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on both measures of profitability, and a statistically insignificant 
negative effect on the unit labor cost. Given that the average value of profit/labor cost and 
profit/equity equal to 0.317 and 0.132, respectively, the mean effect of spinoffs on profitability 
of firms is large. 
The effects of ownership changes on performance vary with the type of owner and 
whether or not the firm is a spinoff. With the ownership coefficients and standard errors in Table 
7 being multiplied by a factor of 100 for ease of interpretation and dispersed ownership serving 
as the base,
21 one can see that the extent of state ownership does not much affect performance in 
either type of firm. The only effects of state ownership that are statistically significant or 
somewhat close to being significant are the negative effects on the two measures of profitability 
in firms without spinoffs. Reducing state ownership during large scale privatization hence brings 
limited positive effects on the profitability of firms that did not experience spinoffs, while the 
effect on spun-off units is insignificant.  
Ownership of firms by an industrial company has positive or insignificant effects on 
performance (relative to dispersed ownership). Greater ownership by an industrial company 
decreases labor costs/sales in both the spun off units and firms that do not experience spinoffs, 
                                                 
21 Dispersed ownership, with no type of owner having more than 10% of the shares is the base contained in the 
constant term.   17
and it also increases profit/equity in firms without spinoffs. With other effects being 
insignificant, industrial firms as new owners hence improve cost efficiency and leave unchanged 
or improve profitability. 
Financial companies and individuals, on the other hand, appear to be owners that do not 
improve and in several aspects reduce efficiency. Financial companies have a negative effect on 
both measures of profitability in the spinoffs and also a positive effect on unit labor cost in firms 
without spinoffs. Greater ownership by individuals has a similarly non-positive effect, with the 
coefficients being mostly insignificant, the effect on profit/labor cost being negative for spinoffs 
and the effect on unit labor cost being positive for firms without spinoffs. 
In Table 8 we report the DID estimates that capture the effect of spinoffs and 
privatization on (growth of) sales. The base effect of spinoffs is large (18%), positive and 
statistically significant at a 7% two-tail test level. The coefficients on dL and dK are insignificant 
and the strong positive effect of spinoffs on the scale of operations (proxied by the logarithm of 
sales) hence does not vary with the size of the spinoff. This finding broadens the support for our 
conclusions based on the estimates of equation (1) that spinoffs have a positive effect on 
corporate performance. 
The effects of changes in ownership structure are varied. A greater reduction of state 
ownership results in greater sales in spun-off units but lower sales in firms without spinoffs. In 
the case of spinoffs, the effect of reducing state ownership stands out against the uniform effect 
of all other types of ownership. In the case of firms without spinoffs, there is no significant sales 
effect associated with ownership by an industrial company, but there is a negative sales effect 
associated with ownership by financial companies and individuals. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our study, based on new data from a rapidly emerging market economy (the Czech 
Republic), suggests that spinoffs and changes in ownership have a number of significant but also 
some insignificant effects on the performance of firms. We show that spinoffs increase the firm’s 
indicators of profitability and scale of operations (sales), but do not reduce in a significant way 
its unit labor cost. The performance effects of privatization depend on the resulting ownership 
structure and on whether or not the firm experienced a spinoff. In particular, smaller state 
ownership does not result in uniform and widespread improvements in performance. It has a   18
weakly significant positive effect on profitability of firms without spinoffs, relative to other types 
of ownership, but other effects are insignificant or mixed. Industrial firms as owners reduce the 
unit labor cost and leave unchanged or increase profitability. Greater ownership by financial 
companies or individuals reduces profitability in spun-off firms and increases unit labor cost and 
reduces sales in firms without spinoffs.  
The overall evidence for spinoffs is hence consistent with our first hypothesis, namely 
that spinoffs have a positive effect on performance – presumably by eliminating prior 
inefficiencies such as diseconomies of scale of large SOE conglomerates, weak managerial 
incentives, information asymmetries, and a lack of focus on core competence. The effect of 
privatization is much less straightforward. Reducing state ownership per se is positive for some 
performance indicators in the case of firms without spinoffs, but it is less so in the spun-off units. 
Industrial firms as owners improve or do not hamper performance and in that sense they behave 
consistently with our first hypotheses. Financial companies and individuals as owners are mostly 
associated with no improvement and in some cases significant declines in performance, thus 
providing evidence that is consistent with our second hypothesis related to tunneling (looting) by 
managers and/or owners in the presence of waning government controls, unclear corporate 
governance, and weak market-oriented legal framework. The effects of privatization are hence 
much less positive and clear-cut than was suggested in many of the early studies. 
Methodologically, our study provides strong evidence that it is important (a) to take into 
account changes in ownership when analyzing the effect of spinoffs, and (b) to control for 
endogeneity, selection and data attrition when analyzing the effects of spinoffs and privatization.   19
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Figure 1 
A Stylized Model of a Corporate Spinoff 
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Figure 2 
Shares of Labor and Capital Spun-off from the Parent Firm at the time of the Split 
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Figure 3 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics on Projects to Privatize Enterprises in the First 
Wave of the Czech Voucher Scheme  
 
           
  
No. of 
Projects  No. of Firms 
No. of 
Projects per 
Firm 
Projects Submitted  11349 2404 4.7 
Decision Reached   10514 2128 4.9 
Projects Approved  3669 1963 1.9 
Projects Rejected  6845 165 41.5 
Remaining to be 
Decided  935 276 3.4 
      
Source: Ministry of 
Finance      
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Table 2  
Proposers of Privatization Projects in the Czech Republic 
  
Project Submitted by  Total  Percentage 
Management of Company  2813 25 
Management of Plants  450 4 
Bidders for Purchase of 
Company  4388 39 
District Privatization 
Commission  788 7 
Restitution Claimants  450 4 
Local Government   450 4 
Consulting Firms   338 3 
Others  1575 14 
Total  11252 100 
    
Source: Kotrba and Svejnar 
(1994)    
1. Bidders for purchase of company are proposers of competing projects who wish 
to purchase the company. 
2. Consulting firms submit projects proposing sales to other entities or applying to 
get a contract for organizing a tender or auction. 
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Table 3  
Summary Statistics of Pre-Spinoff  Indicators in 1990 
     
  
Mean  Std. 
Dev. Min Max Median  No.of 
Firms 
Parent Enterprises    44
Profit 171.1  0.4 -271.8 2,050.2 20.2  44
Sales 1,847.8  2.7 60.0 14,500.0 686.1  44
Employment 2,435  3,729 175 23,138 1,334  44
Assets 1,930.0  8.6 47.2 57,600.0 331.1  44
Liabilities 431.9  0.9 2.9 5,787.4 140.8  44
    
No. of Spinoffs  2.98  1.5 2 9 2  44
No. of Projects
1 8.98  12.2 1 77 5  44
Firms without Spinoffs    780
Profit  73.7 0.7 -612.8 16,700.0 5.6 778
Sales  828.4 2.8 1.5 50,800.0 213.5 779
Employment 1,156  3,049 3 49,701 402  780
Assets  313.4 0.8 2.2 9,391.4 105.5 780
Liabilities  232.1 0.8 0.1 14,400.0 53.6 717
    
No. of Projects
1  2.96 4.4 1 41 1 780
Spun-off Units     131
Profit  57.9 0.2 -267.2 1,874.4 4.7 130
Sales  620.6 1.5 6.2 13,100.0 133.9 131
Employment  818 1,901 23 17,880 294  131
Assets  648.2 4.3 15.8 49,200.0 78.1 131
Liabilities  157.0 0.5 0.1 5,295.1 27.7 121
      
1 Original projects were assigned only to the master firms and to control group. Hence no information on 
number of projects is available for spun-off units. 
All financial indicators are expressed in mn. CZK (average exchange rate in period studied $1=30CZK) 
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Table 4 
Proposed Allocation of Shares Among Privatizing Parties in the Winning Projects (in %) 
                 
      Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Spun-off Units  Foreign Owner  1.15 6.75 0  51
  Domestic Owner  2.15 9.52 0  52
  Restitution  0.46 2.44 0  18
 
Fund of National Property 
(Temporary)  8.30 14.74 0  57
 
Fund of National Property 
(Permanent)  0.12 0.51 0  3
  Sale throughout Intermediary  0.34 2.34 0  20
  Municipality Transfer  3.21 8.20 0  67
   Other  0.00 0.00 0  0
Firms without Spinoffs  Foreign Owner  1.74 9.08 0  75
  Domestic Owner  4.28 14.42 0  84
  Restitution  0.41 2.70 0  58
 
Fund of National Property 
(Temporary)  5.98 13.19 0  82
 
Fund of National Property 
(Permanent)  0.28 3.07 0  45
  Sale throughout Intermediary  1.83 7.66 0  72
  Municipality Transfer  0.88 2.34 0  20
   Other  0.07 0.94 0  16
Full Sample  Foreign Owner  1.66 8.78 0  75
  Domestic Owner  3.97 13.84 0  84
  Restitution  0.42 2.66 0  58
 
Fund of National Property 
(Temporary)  6.31 13.44 0  82
 
Fund of National Property 
(Permanent)  0.26 2.85 0  45
  Sale throughout Intermediary  1.62 7.16 0  72
  Municipality Transfer  1.22 3.87 0  67
   Other  0.06 0.87 0  16
        
Note: The number of observation is equal to 131 for spun-off snits, 780 for control group and 911 for the full 
sample. 
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Table 5 
Industrial Sectors and Regional Distribution of the Firms Studied  
          
Variable  Spun-off Units Control Group 
Full 
Sample 
Regions    
Prague 12.2% 20.4%  19.2% 
Central Bohemia  6.1% 8.5%  8.1% 
Southern Bohemia  2.3% 6.5%  5.9% 
Western Bohemia  13.7% 8.2%  9.0% 
Northern Bohemia  9.9% 11.7%  11.4% 
Eastern Bohemia  12.2% 11.5%  11.6% 
Southern Moravia  22.9% 18.5%  19.1% 
Northern Moravia  20.6% 14.7%  15.6% 
    
Industrial Sectors    
Agriculture 1.5% 1.4%  1.4% 
Heavy Machinery  48.9% 34.6%  36.7% 
Light Machinery  13.0% 19.6%  18.7% 
Constructions 12.2% 21.5%  20.2% 
Transportation 2.3% 2.4%  2.4% 
Trade 3.1% 12.1%  10.8% 
R & D  1.5% 1.9%  1.9% 
Services 13.0% 4.0%  5.3% 
Financial 4.6% 2.4%  2.7% 
    
Note: The number of observation is equal to 131 for spun-off units, 780 for 
firms without spinoffs and 911 for the full sample. 
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Table 6 
Summary Statistics of Performance Indicators: 1995-1996 
                 
      Mean Std. 
Dev. Min Max  Num. 
Firms 
1995      
Spun-off Units  Labor Costs  96.4 0.27 1.12 2,405 91 
  Sales  1,067.5 5.35 1.59 50,570 91 
 
Profit/ Labor 
Costs  0.5 1.20 -2.70 7 91 
   Profit / Equity  0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.9 91 
Firms without Spin-offs  Labor Costs  82.6 0.14 0.90 2,229 538 
  Sales  558.8 1.72 0.27 29,872 538 
 
Profit/ Labor 
Costs  0.3 0.89 -2.89 7 538 
   Profit / Equity  0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.9 538 
Full Sample  Labor Costs  84.6 0.17 0.90 2,405 629 
  Sales  632.4 2.58 0.27 50,570 629 
 
Profit/ Labor 
Costs  0.3 0.95 -2.89 7 629 
   Profit / Equity  0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.9 629 
1996      
Spun-off Units  Labor Costs  112.5 0.32 4.73 2,818 86 
  Sales  1,210.9 6.03 2.08 55,495 86 
 
Profit/ Labor 
Costs  0.4 1.01 -2.36 6 86 
   Profit / Equity  0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.9 86 
Firms without Spin-offs  Labor Costs  91.4 0.16 0.60 2,415 522 
  Sales  536.4 1.20 0.16 17,423 522 
 
Profit/ Labor 
Costs  0.3 0.76 -2.38 6 522 
   Profit / Equity  0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.9 522 
Full Sample  Labor Costs  94.3 0.19 0.60 2,818 608 
  Sales  631.8 2.53 0.16 55,495 608 
 
Profit/ Labor 
Costs  0.3 0.80 -2.38 6 608 
   Profit / Equity  0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.9 608 
     
Labor Costs and Sales are expressed in million CZK.  Exchange rates at the end of 1995 and 1996 were $1=26.6 CZK 
and $1=27.3 CZK, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Effects of Spinoffs and Changes in Ownership Structure on Performance 
(Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates; Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
                    
Dependent Variable: 
Labor Costs/ 
Sales 
Profit/ Labor 
Costs  Profit/Equity 
Effects of Spinoffs 
-0.009    0.991  5  0.174  1 
S(Base Effect) 
(0.028)    (0.460)    (0.066)   
dL (Share of Original Labor Force)  0.018    0.153    0.073  10 
  (0.033)    (0.164)    (0.039)   
dK (Share of Original Capital)  -0.529  5  0.026    -0.074  10 
   (0.027)     (0.247)     (0.042)    
Effects of Ownership Structure: Spun-off Units 
Industrial firm  -0.693  1  -2.302    -0.603   
  (0.264)    (2.408)    (0.442)   
Financial company  0.332    -8.248  5  -1.310  5 
  (0.301)    (3.808)    (0.573)   
Individual owner  0.111    -18.628  5  -1.878   
  (0.669)    (9.518)    (1.471)   
State  0.303    -8.631    -1.297   
  (0.558)    (6.596)    (1.227)   
Effect of Ownership Structure: Control Group of Firms with No Spinoffs 
Industrial firm  -0.45  1  0.853    0.731  1 
  (0.109)    (0.600)    (0.235)   
Financial company  0.277  5  0.096   -0.098   
 (0.121)    (0.722)    (0.321)   
Individual owner  0.445  10  -1.794    0.016   
  (0.263)    (1.680)    (0.756)   
0.233    -2.638  10  -1.388   
State 
(0.234)    (1.507)    (0.861)   
Constant  0.241  1  1.201  1  0.290  5 
  (0.021)    (0.270)    (0.129)   
Mills' Ratio  0.033    -1.225    -0.270  5 
   (0.028)     (0.282)     (0.129)    
Pre-split performance indicators 
            
Yes    
          
Yes    
         
Yes    
R-square  0.061    0.072   0.153   
Adjusted R-square  0.047   0.058   0.140   
Number of Observations  1280   1279   1234   
Hausman test (degree of freedom)  102.3  (6)   48.9  (8)   422.9  (7)   
Upper tail area  < 0.01     < 0.01     < 0.01    
 
Note: Since after a spinoff and subsequent privatization the state only reduces its share, the coefficients associated 
with state ownership refer to a reduction of state ownership 
1= Significant at 1% statistical test level.   
5 = Significant at 5% statistical test level.             
10 = Significant at 10% statistical test level.               32
Table 8 
Effect of Split-related Characteristics on Performance 
Difference in Difference Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
        
   ln Sales 
   IV 
Effects of Spinoffs    
18.213  10  s(Base Effect) 
(9.828)   
     
0.022   
dL (Share of Original Labor Force) 
(0.168)   
     
-0.092    dK (Share of Original Capital) 
(0.082)    
Effects of Ownership Structure: Spun-off Units       
7.251    Industrial firm 
(4.731)   
1.313    Financial company 
(5.372)   
8.741   
Individual owner  (11.416)   
-17.099  10  State 
(9.849)   
Effect of Ownership Structure: Control Group of Firms with No Spinoffs 
0.270    Industrial firm 
(1.533)   
-5.688  1  Financial company 
(1.454)   
-5.902  10 
Individual owner  (3.507)   
2.299  1  State 
(0.291)    
-5.211  1 
Mills' Ratio  (0.431)    
R-square  0.130  
Adjusted R-square  0.122  
Number of Observations  1347  
Hausman test (degree of freedom)  22.238  
Upper tail area  < 0.01    
We instrument for both split and ownership (IV). 
Note: Since we define all ownership categories in terms of a change in ownership between 1995-6 and 1990, the 
state ownership variable refers to the reduction of the state's share while for the remaining categories this difference 
reflects an increase. 
1= Significant at 1% stat. test level. 
5 = Significant at 5% stat. test level.     
10 = Significant at 10% stat. test level.     33 
Appendix 
 
Table A1: 
Time-varying Coefficient Estimates of the Effects of Spinoffs and 
Changes in Ownership Structure on Performance 
(Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates; Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
                    
Dependent Variables: 
Labor 
Costs/ 
Sales 
Profit/ 
Labor Costs 
Profit per 
Equity 
Effects of Spinoffs 
-0.009   0.997 5  0.175 1  S (Base Effect)  (0.028)   (0.464)   (0.066)  
dL (Share of Labor Force)            
0.340   -0.022   0.076   1995 Effect  (0.456)   (0.222)   (0.053)  
0.001   0.338   0.067   1996 Effect  (0.047)   (0.231)   (0.062)  
dK (Share of Capital)          
-0.054   0.278   -0.057   1995 Effect  (0.038)   (0.364)   (0.055)  
-0.050   -0.229   -0.090  
1996 Effect 
(0.040)     (0.304)     (0.057)    
Effects of Ownership Structure: Spunoff Units 
-0.691 1  -2.328   -0.606   Industrial firm  (0.266)   (2.423)   (0.446)  
0.331   -8.265 5  -1.315 5  Financial company  (0.303)   (3.835)   (0.576)  
0.097   -18.658 5  -1.904   Individual owner  (0.671)   (9.551)   (1.471)  
0.302   -8.647   -1.312  
State 
(0.562)   (6.623)   (1.224)  
Effect of Ownership Structure: Control Group of Firms with No Spinoffs 
-0.45 1  0.85   0.730 1 
Industrial firm  (0.109)   (0.601)   (0.235)  
0.278 5  0.105   -0.096   Financial company  (0.121)   (0.722)   (0.321)  
0.447   -1.780   0.018  
Individual owner  (0.263)   (1.681)   (0.756)  
0.233   -2.657 10  -1.388 10 
State  (0.233)     (1.507)     (0.861)    
0.241 1  1.199 1  0.289 5 
Constant  (0.028)   (0.270)   (0.129)  
0.033   -1.224 1  -0.269 5 
Mills Ratio  (0.029)     (0.282)     (0.129)    
Pre-split performance indicators  Yes     Yes     Yes    
R-square  0.061   0.073    0.153   
Adjusted R-square  0.045   0.058    0.138   
Number of Observations  1280   1279    1234   
Hausman test (degree of freedom)  40.2 (6)    107.2 (7)    32.2 (7)   
Upper tail area  < 0.01     < 0.01     < 0.01    
Note: Since after a spinoff and subsequent privatization the state only reduces its share, the coefficients 
associated with state ownership refer to a reduction of state ownership 
1= Significant at 1% stat. test level.   
5 = Significant at 5% stat. test level             
10 = Significant at 10% stat. test level.              
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